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Abstract 
 
In this paper we examine empirically the market for local amenities in the Paris metropolitan region. 
We find first that there is considerable inequality in the spatial distribution of these local amenities, 
including accessibility, environmental and social indicators. We use a spatial representation and Lorenz 
curves to examine the degree of inequality in these amenities, and this provides evidence that some 
amenities (or disamenities) are much more inequitably distributed than others. The most extremely 
unequally distributed amenities are noise (due to its concentration near airports), “Redevelopment Areas”, 
presence of water (lakes and rivers) and forests, and presence of train and subway stations. Some 
indicators, such as the “Poulit accessibility” measure, were by contrast remarkably constant over the 
region. We recognize that local amenities should be capitalized into the housing market, and explore the 
willingness to pay of households for these amenities within the Paris region using alternative 
specifications of a location choice model. One of the core questions we examine is the spatial scale of the 
amenity effects and how this is captured in a location choice context. By estimating models at both a 
commune and at a grid cell level, we obtain new insights into how households in the Paris region trade off 
amenities against each other and against housing cost. We find that the residential location choice model 
fits the data moderately better at the smaller scale of the grid cell compared to the commune. 
 
Keywords: Inequality; Efficiency; Local public goods; Residential location; Integrated model; 
Transportation modelling; Paris area. 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Integrated land use and transportation models have received increased attention in 
research and practice over the past decade, principally based on their ability to examine 
the combined effects of land use and transportation policies on the endogenous system 
of urban development and patterns of travel, and their ability to represent the long-term 
induced travel effects of expansion in transportation capacity (Waddell, Ulfarsson, 
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Franklin and Lobb, 2007). The utility of integrated models goes well beyond the 
examination of induced travel demand effects, however. There is considerable potential 
to use these tools to examine questions such as efficiency and equity in markets for 
local public goods (and local public bads). In addition, there has been growing interest 
in using integrated models to examine the spatial patterns and distributional effects of 
environmental externalities such as vehicle-related emissions (Wegener, 2004). In this 
paper, we undertake an analysis of inequality in the spatial distribution of accessibility 
and environmental quality in the Paris metropolitan region, using an integrated land use 
and transport model system, and examine how these (dis)amenities are capitalized into 
the housing market. 
Our approach integrates recent work in urban land use modelling (see, e.g. Waddell, 
Borning, Noth, Freier, Becke and Ulfarsson, 2003 and Waddell, Ulfarsson, Franklin and 
Lobb, 2007) with recent advances in dynamic transportation modelling (see, e.g. de 
Palma, Lindsey and Kilani, 2005) to provide an integrated platform for land use and 
transportation policy analysis. UrbanSim is a land use model system that simulates the 
location choices of households and firms, the real estate development choices of 
developers and real estate prices resulting from the interactions of these agents in urban 
real estate markets (see Waddell, Ulfarsson, Franklin and Lobb, 2007 for details). A 
range of urban amenities and disamenities, including accessibility, land use, and social 
composition are incorporated in the model system through the utilities of location 
choice and as determinants of dwelling prices. UrbanSim is a microsimulation model 
system that simulates individual households and firms (or jobs), and models the changes 
in the composition of the population of households and firms, and their locations, on an 
annual basis. The aggregate targets for population and employment are defined for the 
region as a set of constraints, or control totals. Models representing relocation, location 
choice, real estate development and prices are connected via their operations on a shared 
database, which is updated from one simulation year to the next. Accessibilities are 
measured by interfacing UrbanSim with a travel model, and combining results of traffic 
assignment with the spatial patterns of activity location predicted by UrbanSim. 
METROPOLIS simulates the dynamic traffic patterns over the course of a day, based 
on the spatial distribution of households and jobs and the configuration of the 
transportation network (see de Palma, Marchal and Nesterov, 1997 for details). 
Transportation demand is represented at the microscopic level allowing representation 
of population heterogeneity and providing detailed information about travellers’ costs. 
Transportation supply is represented by a macroscopic model of road traffic that 
computes travel times on links based in this paper on a simple congestion function. The 
information transferred from METROPOLIS to UrbanSim is a matrix that gives the 
individual travellers’ surplus in each Origin–Destination pair. In UrbanSim, the 
accessibility measures from METROPOLIS influence residential and business location 
choices, real estate development and real estate prices. UrbanSim then simulates these 
location choices, which are in turn used to update an O-D matrix that is then used in the 
next iteration of METROPOLIS. This cycle is repeated at time steps that could be as 
small as one year (the time step for UrbanSim), to reflect the joint evolution of the 
transportation system conditions and urban development patterns. More details are 
provided in de Palma, Motamedi, Picard and Waddell, 2005. 
By linking these two model systems, it is possible to examine in a more 
comprehensive way than has been possible previously the implication of a range of 
urban externalities on travel, land use, and environmental outcomes. Our intent is to 
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apply the integrated model system to an analysis that examines inequality and efficiency 
in the markets for local public goods. We concentrate on two types of externalities: 
accessibility and environmental quality (or to be more precise, its degradation by 
pollution). Note that in order for a public good to have the potential to influence intra-
metropolitan location choice, prices and urban development, it should meet two 
necessary conditions: (1) it is unevenly distributed over the region; (2) it is valued by 
households. 
In the next section, we present a brief review of economics literature concerning 
urban externalities and inequality in urban areas. The third section describes the region 
under study and available data, and discusses spatial disparities and population 
inequalities in the region. We propose in this paper a simple measure of inequality 
based on Lorenz curves. In the fourth section, we examine through a discrete choice 
model of residential location how households in the region trade-off these local public 
goods against housing cost. This provides direct evidence on their willingness to pay for 
these local public goods. Estimation results are reported and discussed in the fifth 
section. The sixth section concludes this paper. 
 
 
2. Externalities and urban form 
 
In many situations, the cost associated with the action of an agent is not equal to the 
cost born by the society (social cost). If the cost born by an individual is smaller than 
the social cost, externalities are negative (pollution, noise and accident provide the 
easiest examples). On the other hand, if the social cost is smaller than the individual 
cost (or if the social benefit is larger than the individual benefit), externalities are 
positive (green spaces provide by some individuals provide an example of such positive 
externalities). Externalities are endemic in urban life, and motivate much of urban 
public policy and sometimes, pricing or quantity regulations. Externalities represent a 
market failure, in the sense that the market does not produce an efficient outcome in the 
presence of externalities. They justify, according to Pigou (1920), government 
intervention. Pigouvian taxes or subsidies introduce prices that internalise the 
externalities (for example, road pricing can address congestion externalities)1. Such 
taxes can be positive (as in private transportation, to take into account congestion and 
pollution) or negative (in this case, it is a subsidy, as in the education sector).  
Coase (1960) later argued that the market could internalize such externalities by 
means of private contracts between affected parties. Coase’s Theorem can be 
summarized as follows: if transaction costs among private persons are nil and there are 
no income effects, the externalities may lead to a mutually beneficial agreement 
between the parties without any government intervention. However, as Coase knew, 
transaction costs are seldom zero, and other solutions are required. In particular, the 
assumption of zero transaction cost is not acceptable in the context of urban and 
regional development.  
We are concerned in this paper with the examination of externalities in the urban 
context. Pollution caused by industrial plants in the early 20th century precipitated the 
                                                 
1 See also the early contribution of Knight, 1924. The Pigou-Knight controversy is described in detail in 
Pahaut and Sikow, 2006. 
European Transport \ Trasporti Europei  n. 36 (2007): 47-74 
 50
development of zoning policy in the United States, and led to the widespread use of land 
use regulation to separate land uses that were considered incompatible. Traffic 
congestion and air pollution are notorious externalities arising from private travel 
choices. Massive public investments attempt to reduce congestion, generally with 
limited success due to the underlying incentives to over-consume transportation arising 
from its under-pricing (the exclusion of external costs from the calculations of the 
individual traveller). Of course, the situation in the US and in Europe is very different 
with respect to transportation costs: the price of gasoline is probably too low is the US 
and too high in Europe (see the details on the computation of the optimal price of 
gasoline in Small and Parry, 2005). 
Although urban externalities can be positive, as in the case of knowledge spillovers, 
or technological externalities, and other interactions that lead to agglomeration 
economies and the rise of employment centers (see for example, Krugman, 1991), most 
literature addressing urban externalities focuses on the negative effects of certain land 
uses such as polluting industries, of low-density urban form generally referred to as 
sprawl, and of travel patterns dominated by extensive use of single-occupancy vehicles. 
A variety of approaches to determine the nature and magnitude of these externalities has 
been developed, but the most common approach is the use of hedonic regression to 
estimate the effect of the externalities on housing prices. Since locational amenities and 
disamenities are likely to be capitalized into the price of housing due to the locational 
fixity of the housing stock and its durability, house prices provide a convenient measure 
of the degree to which housing consumers value the presence of a particular externality. 
Many studies, numbering at least in hundreds, have attempted to measure in different 
localities the housing price impacts of urban externalities, especially with respect to 
environmental degradation. Note that this approach is represented as capturing both 
point-source and broader non point source effects from water, air and noise pollution. 
Early research along this line was reviewed by Brown and Li, 1980. For a recent review 
of studies of the housing price effects of air quality, water quality, undesirable land 
uses, neighbourhood effects, and multiple environmental effects, see Boyle and Kiel, 
2001. To our knowledge, the housing price effects of traffic congestion have not yet 
been systematically explored, though there is considerable research on the capitalization 
of various measures of accessibility in housing prices. 
Much has also been written about the externalities associated with urban sprawl (see, 
for example, Verhoef and Nijkamp, 2003, Koland, 2006, and Chan, 2004), a term used 
to describe low-density, auto-oriented development. A systematic attempt to estimate 
the costs of sprawl was undertaken by Burchell et al., 1998, though the problems 
associated with measuring sprawl have not been easy to overcome. Brueckner (2000) 
argued that urban sprawl represents three related forms of market failure: “These are the 
failure to account for the benefits of open space, excessive commuting because of a 
failure to account for the social costs of congestion, and failure to make new 
development pay for the infrastructure costs it generates.” This assessment led 
Brueckner to advocate for development impact fees and for congestion pricing as means 
to internalise the externalities related to urban sprawl. 
Aside from the efforts to measure the effects of externalities on housing prices noted 
above, there appears to be a dearth of research examining broader influences of 
externalities in urban areas on outcomes such as residential location or business location 
or on real estate development. Nor is there any significant body of literature that 
provides an analytic framework for addressing transportation and land use 
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interdependencies in the context of urban externalities. We suggest that this is an 
important gap in the literature, and that an integrated land use and transportation 
analytic framework is useful to better inform public policies intended to address these 
urban externalities.  
Beyond the political implications of inequality, we anticipate that inequality in the 
spatial distribution of amenities or disamenities produced by local externalities impact 
households differentially, and influence their location preferences. Social externalities 
such as those produced by the social composition of neighbourhoods interact with the 
social preferences of households making location choices to influence patterns of social 
clustering and segregation. We explore these and other interactions between household 
preferences and local externalities in Section 5. 
 
 
3. Descriptive analysis of the study area 
 
The Ile de France is the capital region of France. It is a large metropolitan region of 
over 11 million inhabitants, with the city of Paris at its core (See Appendix Fig. 8). 
There are two spatially-nested levels of administrative units we will refer to in this 
paper: (1) 1300 “Communes” corresponding to municipalities outside Paris, and to 
“Arrondissements” or large administrative neighbourhoods with local governance 
within Paris; and (2) 8 districts that are administrative units overlaying communes. In 
order to provide a context for our analysis of the inequality of externalities in this 
region, we present below indicators of accessibility and environmental quality for the 
communes. An additional unit of analysis we use in this paper is a grid of 500 meter 
resolution, resulting in approximately 50,000 cells in the region (see appendix figure 8 
where dots represent cells2). We compare below the variability of the different local 
attributes at the three geographical levels, and comment on the consequences of these 
inequalities. 
Table 1 presents accessibility and environmental variables and indicates their average 
values in each district. The cells’ attributes are weighted by the number of households in 
the cell in order to compute these averages. Table 1 also indicates average values of 
other variables, which are defined only at the commune level. These averages are also 
weighted by the number of households in the commune.  
Table 2 shows the variance decomposition at the three relevant geographical levels: 
district, commune and grid cell (and therefore only for which are available at grid cell 
level). For each variable X, the model is: 
 ,dcg d c gX µ η ξ ε= + + +  (1) 
where, according to the analysis of variance model, dcgX  denotes the value of X in grid 
cell g located in commune c and in district d, µ is the average level of X in Ile-de-
France, , andd c gη ξ ε  are independent random Gaussian variables with zero mean and 
variances ², ² and ²d c gσ σ σ , respectively. The total variance of X is denoted by 
                                                 
2 See also appendix figures 10 and 11 where square represents a cell with its 8 neighbouring cells. 
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² ² ² ²d c gσ σ σ σ≡ + + , and the fraction of variance (reported in Table 2) at level i, i=d, c, 
g, is: 100 ² / ²i iα σ σ= • , with 100d c gα α α+ + = . 
Table 1: Average accessibility and environmental variables, by District (over grid cells and population-
weighted). 
Variable \ District 75 92 94 93 78 91 95 77 
Number of Grid Cells 420 704 980 952 9400 7399 5187 24194 
Number of Communes 20 36 47 40 262 196 185 514 
Distance and accessibility                 
Subway and tramway stations 8.17 0.80 0.65 0.72 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Subway and tramway stations around 71.93 7.14 5.77 6.49 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Train stations 0.98 0.75 0.44 0.53 0.53 0.47 0.68 0.30 
Train stations around 9.35 6.89 3.94 4.76 4.29 4.07 5.60 2.35 
Accessibility to employment (Public Transit) 50.93 49.29 48.02 48.25 45.20 44.30 45.97 41.86 
Accessibility to employment (Private Car) 54.45 53.88 53.42 53.48 51.18 51.15 51.82 48.60 
Accessibility to employment (M)* -72.9 -72.3 -73.9 -74.0 -73.8 -93.3 -68.8 -89.9 
Average travel time (Public Transit) 28.08 31.54 38.45 38.54 47.84 52.04 46.24 48.86 
Average travel time (Private Car) 16.19 16.08 16.31 16.90 24.13 36.58 20.31 35.59 
Accessibility to shops (Public Transit) 33.24 32.25 31.98 32.06 30.28 30.25 30.94 28.66 
Accessibility to shops (Private Car) 35.58 35.30 35.30 35.31 34.06 34.27 34.48 32.96 
Private car travel time variability 2.72 4.11 3.07 3.46 3.55 6.65 3.71 3.56 
Distance to arterial 2.03 1.28 0.74 0.67 3.27 1.62 2.71 2.15 
Distance to highway 1.48 1.19 1.27 1.28 2.78 3.12 2.34 4.68 
Distance to Châtelet 3.57 8.95 11.42 10.88 27.64 26.36 20.27 41.50 
Environment                 
% surface in Noisy areas (severe noise: >96dB) 0.00 0.00 4.44 0.03 0.00 2.32 1.36 0.76 
% surface of Parks and Gardens 7.59 9.13 9.54 8.65 13.09 12.66 10.60 12.74 
% surface of Water  0.90 1.37 1.80 0.65 1.42 0.98 0.71 1.43 
% surface of forests 0.27 1.54 1.20 1.01 7.15 7.28 3.97 8.02 
% surface of Sporting facilities 1.43 3.05 2.48 3.03 2.42 2.36 2.89 1.77 
% surface of Public facilities 9.32 13.72 13.20 12.69 22.67 22.31 17.46 22.52 
% surface of Open Space 8.95 12.13 12.60 12.54 16.18 15.65 14.31 14.99 
% surface in Redevelopment area** 5.01 8.32 5.23 8.14 2.18 6.67 6.57 1.63 
Source: Authors’ computations from IAURIF GIS database and Metropolis computations. 
* Travellers’ surplus computed by METROPOLIS, see relevant section. ** Redevelopment Areas, translated from 
French: ‘Zone Urbaine Sensible’3. The variables in italics are computed at the commune level and not represented in 
Table 2. 
 
We comment hereafter on Tables 1 and 2 together. Note that the variance 
decomposition and district average values give only limited information concerning the 
inequalities in distance, accessibility and environmental variables. A more complete 
overview is given by Lorenz curves, which are used to represent the distribution of a 
characteristic Y among a population4. We now consider specific amenities reported in 
Tables 1 and 2. 
                                                 
3 There is no precise translation for the term ‘Zones Urbaines Sensibles’, but these are areas with high 
concentrations of social and economic difficulties targeted for government assistance or redevelopment 
investments. We will use the term Redevelopment Areas for this. 
4 The Lorenz curve was developed by Max O. Lorenz in 1905 for representing income distribution. It 
shows for the bottom x% of households (plotted on the x-axis), what percentage y% of the total Y 
corresponds to them (plotted on the y-axis). Perfect Equality (each household has the same quantity of Y) 
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Table 2: Variance decomposition of accessibility and environmental variables over different scales. 
Variable District (σd) Commune (σc) Cell (σg) 
Distance and accessibility    
Number of subway and tramway stations 60.5% 22.1% 17.4% 
Number of subway and tramway stations 
around 
65.2% 22.3% 12.4% 
Number of train stations  10.0% 23.1% 66.9% 
Number of train stations around 17.0% 33.4% 49.6% 
Accessibility to employment (Public Transit) 35.1% 64.9% 0.0% 
Accessibility to employment (Private Car) 39.1% 60.9% 0.0% 
Accessibility to shops (Public Transit) 34.9% 65.1% 0.0% 
Accessibility to shops (Private Car) 35.8% 64.2% 0.0% 
Distance to nearest arterial 7.8% 84.1% 8.1% 
Distance to nearest highway 7.8% 83.0% 9.2% 
Distance to Châtelet (Paris center) 42.7% 56.9% 0.4% 
Environment    
% surface in Noisy area (severe noise: >96dB) 1.8% 62.4% 35.9% 
% surface of Parks and Gardens 5.2% 17.2% 77.6% 
% surface of Water 7.4% 19.3% 73.4% 
% surface of forests 2.5% 36.2% 61.3% 
% surface in ‘Redevelopment Areas’ 3.9% 17.3% 78.8% 
% surface of Public Facilities 0.5% 19.3% 80.3% 
% surface of Open Space 1.9% 37.6% 60.5% 
% surface of Sporting Facilities  2.0% 11.3% 86.7% 
Source: Authors’ computations from IAURIF GIS database. 
 
Subway, tramway and train stations 
 
The number of (subway, tramway and train) stations around a cell corresponds to the 
number of stations in a cell and its 8 neighbouring cells. As a consequence, the average 
number of stations around a cell is approximately 9 times the average number of 
stations in the cell. The small differences are explained by the fact that some adjacent 
cells are located in a district different from the one of the cell considered. The fraction 
of the variance at the grid cell level is significantly lower for the stations around the cell 
compared to the stations in the cell, which goes along intuition. Train stations are 
distributed rather equally between the 8 districts (see Table 1), and between the 
communes (most of the variance is at the cell level), although they are less concentrated 
in the outer ring, especially in the East. 
The inequalities are more prominent in the distribution of subway or tramway 
stations: more than 60% (resp. 70%) of households live in cells with no train (resp. 
subway) stations either in the cell or in the 8 surrounding cells (Appendix Fig. 1). These 
percentages are even larger when restricting to the number of stations in a single cell. 
The large inequalities in the presence of subway stations are consistent with the fact that 
they are concentrated in Paris and in the inner ring surrounding Paris. Consequently, the 
                                                                                                                                               
corresponds to the diagonal, while Perfect Inequality (a single household has all Y) corresponds to the x-
axis together with a vertical line at x=100%. A Lorenz curve is always increasing and convex, and located 
between the lines of Perfect Equality and of Perfect Inequality. When the Lorenz curve is farther from the 
Perfect Equality line, this reflects more inequality. In this paper we apply this idea to measure spatial 
inequalities in an urban area. 
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largest fraction of the variance for the numbers of subway and tramway stations (both in 
the cell and around it) is at the district ( dα ) level (see Appendix Fig. 10 and 11). 
 
Distance to main roads or center of region 
 
The distances are given in kilometers. As seen in Table 2, most of the variability for 
the distance to arterial or to highway is at the commune level, which suggests that 
arterials and highways are rather equally distributed between districts, but not between 
communes. Table 1, on the other hand, suggests a different interpretation, since it shows 
important differences between district averages. However, the apparently large 
differences between district averages in Table 1 hides even larger differences between 
communes in the same district. This apparent inconsistency is partly due to the fact that 
District 77 is very large (nearly half the total number of cells in Ile-de-France, 
corresponding to the entire East part of the outer ring) and the distance to arterial or to 
highway is particularly unevenly distributed in this large district (see Appendix Fig. 12 
and 13). Tables 1 and 2 (and intuition) agree that a large fraction (43%) of the 
variability in (Euclidian) distance to Châtelet is at the district level (Châtelet is the main 
regional trains station located in the centre of Paris, see Appendix Fig. 9), and an even 
larger fraction (57%) of the variance is at the commune level.  
The distances to Châtelet, highway or arterial are more unequally distributed than 
travel times (see Appendix Fig. 2 and 3), with the 20% of the population farthest from 
Châtelet (resp. from the closest arterial or highway) sharing 45% (resp. 50% and 55%) 
of the distance to Châtelet (resp. to closest arterial or highway). 
 
Travel times 
 
The travel times are given in minutes. The average travel time by Private Car is 
slightly more unequally distributed than the average travel time by Public Transit (see 
Appendix Fig. 3, 14 and 15). Note that the average travel time by Private Car roughly 
increases with the distance to Paris centre, whereas the average travel time by Public 
Transit is low in some regions of the outer ring. This is probably because the averages 
are computed using O - D matrix and people living in the outer ring tend to travel by car 
for longer trips and by Public Transit for shorter trips5. The accessibility to employment 
by Private Car consistently increases with the distance to the Paris Centre, whereas the 
accessibility to employment by Public Transit varies less regularly with the distance to 
Paris Centre, depending on the geographical distribution of train stations.  
 
Accessibility measures 
 
We now consider a set of accessibility variables, computed using the method 
proposed by Jean Poulit in 1974, based on the logarithm of product supply at each 
destination. It takes into account the opportunity jQ  (number of employments or shops) 
at destination j. The utility Sij of travelling from origin i to destination j, subtracting 
travel cost ( ijC ), is:  
 ( ) ijjij CQS −= logλ , (2) 
                                                 
5 See Wenglenski (2002) for the distribution of travelled distance for home-to-work trips for different 
socio-professional categories of workers over the region. 
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where the weighting factor is a
αλ = , α is the value of time (VOT), and a is an 
empirical coefficient used in the gravity trip distribution model. These parameters have 
been estimated using travel survey data (see IAURIF/THEMA, 2005).  
Accessibility from origin i is the log-sum of the accessibilities over all the 
destinations, j, given by: 
  log exp iji j
j
C
S Qλ λ
  = −    ∑ . (3) 
It could be presented in monetary units as traveller’s surplus. Four Poulit accessibility 
measures are calculated for two trip purposes (professional and shopping) with two 
alternative modes (private cars and public transit). 
The variability of Poulit accessibility (to employment or to shops) at the grid cell level 
is clearly null. Cells have the same access attributes within the same travel model zone 
(which are nearly synonymous with communes). The between-districts differences 
represent more than 1/3 of the variance and mainly reflect differences between the city 
of Paris, inner ring and outer ring. Note that the coefficient of variation of the 
accessibility variable is very low, so one point difference represents a large fraction of 
the variance. Indeed, Lorenz curves (see Appendix Fig. 4 and 16 to 19) show that the 
four Poulit accessibility measures are very equally distributed among the population, 
suggesting that these accessibility measures do not really vary within the region. 
Therefore, it seems that the Poulit accessibility measures may significantly 
underestimate inequalities compared to other approaches to measuring accessibility, 
such as travel time.  
We therefore also consider another accessibility measure, unfortunately restricted to 
access to employment using private car. The “accessibility to employment (M)” variable 
corresponds to the average travellers’ surplus (integrated over the morning peak) for 
home to work travels computed by METROPOLIS (see de Palma, Motamedi, Picard 
and Waddell, 2005 for more details). In addition to the travel time cost, this measure 
takes into account schedule delay cost omitted in the Poulit accessibility measure (but 
does not consider the quality of the opportunities offered at the final destination). This 
measure is more unequally distributed than Poulit accessibility but much less than travel 
times (see Fig. 3 in the Appendix which illustrates this with a Lorenz curve). 
 
Environment 
 
The variability of the environment variables is mostly at the grid cell level, which 
means that, if households are sensitive to environmental variables, the relevant location 
choice model should be estimated at the grid cell level rather than at the commune level. 
The between-district differences in environmental variables are very limited, which 
suggests that the average quality of environment is highly localized, and averages out 
across cells within districts. However, Table 1 reveals important differences in forests 
between Paris, inner ring and outer ring districts, as well as important differences in 
noise exposure. Note that the severe noise limit (96 dB), as Appendix Fig. 20 shows, 
corresponds to the zones located around Roissy airport in the North and Orly airport in 
the south. The apparent paradox between Table 1 and 2 concerning forests and noise is 
similar to the one discussed above for the distance to arterial or to highway. Note also 
that the noise measured this way in District 94 is very large because a large airport is 
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located in this small district, close to very dense cells (recall that Table 1 presents 
population-weighted average values). Commune differences are important concerning 
the surface of forests, and even more concerning the exposure to severe noise. A 
decrease of 0.4 to 1.1 percent of dwelling prices for each decibel after 55 has been 
reported (CGP, 2001). It indicates a 40% depreciation of housing prices for dwellings in 
a cell completely located in noisy areas. 
Recreational areas are distributed relatively unequally over the region. The blue curve 
in Appendix Fig. 5 shows the fraction of the cumulated parks and gardens surface as a 
function of the fraction of the cumulated population (ordered by increasing parks and 
gardens surface in the cell). It is similar to Lorenz curves found for income distributions 
in developed countries. It shows that the 20% of households who benefit the least from 
parks and gardens surfaces live in cells which together contain only 5% of parks and 
gardens surfaces, whereas the 20% of households who benefit the most from parks and 
gardens surfaces live in cells which together contain 50% of parks and gardens surfaces. 
The distribution of sports spaces is far more unequal, since more than 40% of the 
population lives in cells with no sports spaces, whereas the 20% of households who 
benefit the most from sports spaces live in cells which together contain 80% of sports 
spaces, as shown in Appendix Fig. 5 and 25. The distribution of forests and water 
surfaces are even more unequal, since nearly 80% and nearly 90%, of the population 
live in cells with no forests or no water, respectively. We notice that here, Water 
concerns land covered permanently by water as lakes and rivers and is considered as an 
amenity. The rather equal distribution of parks and gardens is confirmed by Appendix 
Fig. 5, 22 and 23, which show that both population and parks and gardens are 
approximately concentrated in the same areas, mainly in Paris and inner ring. On the 
other hand, Appendix Fig. 22 shows that forests are unequally distributed among the 
population because forests are concentrated in the least dense regions. The reason for 
the large degree of inequality in water distribution is totally different: water is 
concentrated in a very small number of grid cells, mainly along the rivers, as shown in 
Appendix Fig. 24. 
The disamenities are more unequally distributed. Indeed, less than 15% of the 
population lives in cells classified as “Redevelopment Areas”. Appendix Fig. 21 shows 
that these zones are mainly located in the inner ring. The inequalities are even more 
striking concerning severe noise, which affects only 1.6% of the population, in the sense 
that 1.6% of the households live in a grid cell affected by severe noise.  
 
 
4. Specification of the residential location choice model 
 
To the extent that households have preferences for local amenities and disamenities 
(we will refer to the collection of those simply described in the preceding section), 
spatial variations in these amenities should be capitalized into housing prices, which are 
higher in Paris and the Western part of the inner ring, and lower in outer ring, especially 
in the Eastern part. We turn now to the specification of a discrete choice model of 
residential location to examine willingness-to-pay for local amenities, and the trade-offs 
households make among them. 
We wish so to investigate what is the most appropriate spatial scale for studying 
preferences for locational amenities. This raises the question of the most relevant level 
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for estimating a household location choice model. We are asking whether people have 
preferences for communes or for smaller more homogeneous geographical units. In 
order to answer this question, we estimate two location choice models: one at the 
commune level, and the other one at the grid cell level. This is somewhat different from 
some prior work that has estimated the effects of right hand side variables at different 
levels of aggregation (see, for example, Guo and Bhat, 2005), since here we also vary 
the level of the unit of location choice. 
Assuming that all the dwellings i located in the grid cell k, k=1,…,K, which is located 
in commune j, j=1,…,J, have the same observable attributes (since we do not have 
information on structural attributes of the housing units), household h, h=1,…,N, have 
the same expected utility h hi kV V=  for them. We assume that expected utility is a linear 
combination of grid cell attributes Xk and commune attributes Zj, in which the marginal 
utilities of grid cell and commune attributes can be household-specific. Expected utility 
is therefore of the form: 
 ,hi k h j hV X Zβ γ= +  (4) 
where βh and γh denote the household-specific marginal utilities of grid cell and 
commune attributes, respectively. 
If households choose among communes rather than grid cells, then expected utility of 
a dwelling located in commune j only depends on Zj and is of the form: 
 ( )| ,hj j h j h k h jV Z Z E X Zδ γ β= = +  (5) 
where δh mixes the marginal utilities of commune attributes and the marginal utilities of 
grid cells attributes, weighted by their distribution in the commune. The exact formula 
for ( )|k h jE X Zβ  corresponds to the log-sum in a nested logit model (see Anderson, de 
Palma and Thisse, 1992 for details). 
The total number of dwellings in Ile-de-France is denoted by I; the number of 
dwellings in commune j and in grid cell k are denoted by Cj and Gk, respectively. The 
probability for household h to choose a dwelling i is given by the Multinomial Logit 
formula:  
 
( )
'' 1
exp
,
h
ih
i I h
ii
V
V=
= ∑P  (6) 
Since all the dwellings located in k have the same expected utility, and the same 
probability of being selected, Equation (4) implies that the probability that household h 
selects grid cell k is:  
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Similarly, the probability that household h selects commune j is:  
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We report below the estimation results for the household location choice models at 
the level of 500 x 500 meter cells within the study area, and at the level of communes. 
These analyses extend the previous results reported in de Palma, Motamedi, Picard and 
Waddell, 2005, which were based strictly on a model specified at the level of 
communes. 
 
 
5. Empirical results 
 
We now turn to the results from model estimation. We begin with a comparison of 
two models, one estimated at the grid cell level and the second at the commune level. 
We then proceed to a grid cell level model that combines grid cell and commune 
variables. Table 3 reports the estimation results for the household location choice model 
at the grid cell level, using only grid cell variables and at the commune level, using only 
commune variables. The overall explanatory power at the grid cell level is slightly 
larger than the explanatory power at the commune level (McFadden's LRI=.2414 and 
0.2272, respectively). Table 4 provides results from a grid cell level specification that 
used both grid cell and commune level variables (LRI=0.2440). These new results are 
largely consistent with those presented in Table 3, which we focus on in the following 
discussion of these results.  
We note that the different results obtained for location choice at two different levels 
of geography reflect several influences. One is a measurement effect related to 
aggregation bias. The larger the geographic scope, the more a measure reflects an 
averaging of variation that occurs within it, producing some level of aggregation bias 
due to loss of information in the aggregation process. See, for example, Zellner, 1962, 
for an early test for aggregation bias, and an assessment of aggregation bias in the 
context of choice models by Allenby and Rossi, 1991. The second influence is 
behavioural and perceptual. Households and individuals perceive neighbourhoods and 
the effects of various kinds of amenities differently at different spatial scales. A third 
influence is a reflection of what geographers have referred to as the Modifiable Aerial 
Unit Problem (MAUP), which reflects the general finding that models estimated on 
different levels of geography tend to produce different coefficients, indicating that a 
model is not independent of the scale at which it is applied (Openshaw, 1984). Note that 
it is easy to confound these effects. Guo and Bhat, 2004, have explored the question of 
separating behavioural from MAUP effects in the context of residential location choice 
in the San Francisco Bay area, and proposed a multi-scale logit model (MSL). They 
used parcels represented by household travel survey respondents as the universal choice 
set, and sampled alternatives from within this sample. It is not clear how such a small 
sample of the housing inventory (the survey respondents’ parcels represent a very small 
fraction of the housing stock) would be able to adequately address problems of MAUP 
since the sample of housing alternatives would be very sparsely distributed. Our 
approach differs in that we use exhaustive data of all movers within the region from 
1998 to 1999 as the sample of agents, and represent the full available housing stock in 
the universal choice set, representing these by grid cells in one model, and communes in 
the second. Parcel-level data for the Paris region was unfortunately not available, and 
we recognize that the results will depend in part on the aggregate units of geography we 
were able to use. 
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An unusual aspect of our study is that we were able to obtain information on the prior 
residential location, which we find to be extremely important in influencing residential 
location choice. The most significant variable in our results is (by far) the dummy 
variable indicating that the cell or commune is located in the same district as the one in 
which the household lived before it moved. This indicates that households have a strong 
preference for relocating not too far from their previous residence, which can be partly 
explained by the proximity to their current employment (indeed, 53% of active persons 
work and live in the same district) or to other attachment to their neighbourhood and the 
limit of their search extent. Unfortunately, the previous commune of residence was not 
indicated in our data, so we could not measure the preference to stay in the same 
commune. 
We found that price effects significantly varied as a function of household head age, 
and household income and size. We consider both the prices of flats and of houses, and 
their interactions with some household’s characteristics. We were able to use both 
variables because we observe separately prices for flats and for houses, and their 
correlation is not too large (79% in real terms, 82% in logs). The results commented 
below show that larger and older households are more sensitive to the prices of houses 
than to the prices of flats. This is consistent with the fact that such households have a 
higher probability to live in a house than in a flat, compared to singles or young 
families. In future research, we will explore this issue in more detail and model the 
choice between a house and a flat simultaneously with the location choice. The 
insignificant coefficient of Log(Price of Flat) in Table 3 means that we can not 
determine for a reference individual, aged 40, living alone and with a yearly income 
equal to exp(9.97)=21,400 €6 a significant sensitivity to the prices of flats, possibly due 
to omitted variables. The positive coefficient of the income/price interaction variable 
Log(Price of Flat)* (Log(Income)- Log(Income) ) means that willingness to pay increases 
with income. According to commune level estimates, older and larger families are 
slightly more sensitive to the prices of flats7. Results not reported here show that the 
coefficient of flats price is not sensitive to household head age or family size at the grid 
cell level. Our reference individual seems to prefer communes with higher house prices. 
One can suspect that omitted variable bias (prices are higher in places with better 
unobserved amenities, and their positive effect is not modelled explicitly in the location 
regression) dominates the true negative price effect. However, with the same income 
and family size, houses price effect becomes negative when household head is aged 
over 49 (commune level estimates) or 62 (grid cell level estimates)8. Similarly, at the 
reference income and age, the house price coefficient is negative for families with more 
than 2 members. 
 
 
                                                 
6 This corresponds to the average (in log terms) per capita household income in Ile-de-France. Household 
per capita income corresponds to household income divided by the square root of the number of 
household members, which is an equivalence scale commonly used. 
7 This is implied by the negative signs of the coefficients of Log(Price of Flat)* (Age-40)/10 and of 
Log(Price of Flat)* (Number of hh members – 1). 
8 This figure corresponds to age at which the marginal price effect is zero for the reference income and 
family size, namely 0.08735*Log(Price of House)-0.10359*Log(Price of House)* (Age-40)/10=0 at the 
commune level. 
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Table 3: Estimation results at commune and grid cell level. 
Estim. at commune level Estim. at cell level Variable 
Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic 
Same district as before move 2.53879 275.91 2.53494 272.47 
Paris -0.25412 -10.10 -0.16871 -10.29 
Log(Price of Flat) 0.00644 0.20 0.02178 0.94 
Log(Price of Flat)* (Age-40)/10 -0.02976 -1.74     
Log(Price of Flat)* (Log(Income)- Log(Income) ) 0.40919 8.20 0.24849 5.84 
Log(Price of Flat)* (Number of hh members – 1) -0.04236 -2.40     
Log(Price of House) 0.08735 3.70 0.13934 7.41 
Log(Price of House)* (Age-40)/10 -0.10359 -8.78 -0.11371 -20.90 
Log(Price of House)* (Log(Income)- Log(Income) ) 0.18693 5.78 0.14874 5.17 
Log(Price of House)* (Number of hh members – 1) -0.10932 -8.38 -0.13038 -20.43 
Number Subway stations around     -0.00412 -2.37 
Number Subway stations in the commune / cell 0.00518 4.59 0.00146 0.21 
Number Railway stations around     0.01326 3.85 
Number Railway stations in the commune / cell -0.00940 -4.86 0.00616 0.60 
Average travel time from j, commuting (TC) [hr] 0.02483 0.80 0.04007 1.45 
TC*(Dummy female) [hr] -0.37377 -8.28 -0.29400 -6.56 
Distance to highway [km] -0.00594 -3.10 -0.00146 -0.74 
Distance to arterial [km] -0.00798 -2.98 -0.01500 -5.87 
Distance to Châtelet (Paris centre) [km] 0.00167 2.94 -0.00054 -1.06 
% households with 1 member * 1 member in h 1.87670 20.62 2.27023 30.73 
% households with 2 members* 2 members in h 1.33649 4.20 1.77322 10.03 
% households with 3+ members* 3+ member in h 2.22967 22.16 2.07516 27.98 
% hh with no working member * no working member in h 7.79690 33.91 5.38190 33.49 
% hh with 1 working member * 1 working member in h -0.93134 -5.84 0.50248 4.58 
% hh with 2+ working member * 2+ working member in h 1.66425 14.83 0.40430 5.01 
% hh with a young head 0.45006 3.01 1.02140 10.86 
% hh with a young head * young head in h 4.77740 28.34 3.24295 29.59 
% hh with a middle age head * middle aged head in h -0.69337 -4.16 -0.16208 -1.51 
% Rich hh * Rich h 3.28038 28.36 2.87636 36.58 
% Medium Income hh * medium income h 1.62120 10.11 1.92296 17.00 
% Poor hh * poor h 0.45889 3.53 1.06997 12.11 
% households with a foreign head * foreign head in h 5.04570 26.74 4.57810 37.26 
% households with a foreign head * French head in h -1.99493 -17.44 -1.30553 -16.71 
% of surface in Redevelopment Area * Rich h 0.67811 4.97 -0.22815 -4.28 
% of surface in Redevelopment Area * Med. Inc. h -0.08340 -0.78 -0.19330 -5.16 
% of surface in Redevelopment Area * Poor h 0.43164 4.45 0.16457 4.99 
Log of the number of residential units 0.06682 9.26 0.02295 3.27 
% of Flats in total dwellings * Foreign head in h 1.36775 15.42 0.67595 11.37 
% of Flats in total dwellings * French head in h 0.48469 7.28 0.16077 3.76 
% of Flats in total dwellings * (N. of members - 1) -0.08459 -4.29 -0.05561 -4.29 
% of Flats in total dwellings * young head in h -0.13120 -2.43 -0.03680 -1.01 
% of Flats in total dwellings * old head in h -0.76601 -8.40 -0.18806 -2.82 
% of surface in Noisy area -0.08929 -1.56 -0.07667 -1.52 
% of surface covered by Forest -0.11708 -3.09 -0.29739 -5.05 
% of surf. covered by Forest * N. of Children 0.42292 6.87 0.46115 4.99 
% of surface covered by Water 0.20360 1.62 0.33284 4.24 
% of surface covered by Parks and Gardens -0.42727 -4.22 -0.15159 -2.93 
% of surf. covered by Parks * N. of children -0.12942 -0.71 0.61447 6.67 
% of surface covered by Sporting facilities 0.44171 2.50 -0.37138 -4.06 
% of surf. covered by Sporting facilities * N of children 0.26755 0.83 0.78619 4.93 
Notes: “%” sign represents the proportion. “N. of children” counts family members aged 11 or less. 
Source: Authors’ estimations 
European Transport \ Trasporti Europei  n. 36 (2007): 47-74 
 61
Table 4: Estimation results at grid cell level with grid cell and commune variables. 
Communes’ variables Cells’ variables Variable 
Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic 
Same district as before move 2.53671 271.53   
Paris -0.22675 -8.43   
Log(Price of Flat) -0.01300 -0.51   
Log(Price of Flat)* (Age-40)/10 0.28139 6.29   
Log(Price of Flat)* (Log(Income)- Log(Income) ) 0.14508 7.11   
Log(Price of Flat)* (Number of hh members – 1) -0.13010 -22.93   
Log(Price of House) 0.25108 8.44   
Log(Price of House)* (Age-40)/10 -0.13981 -19.70   
Log(Price of House)* (Log(Income)- Log(Income) )   -0.00322 -1.71 
Log(Price of House)* (Number of hh members – 1) 0.00605 5.16 0.00097 0.14 
Number Subway stations around   -0.00322 -1.71 
Number Subway stations in the commune / cell 0.00605 5.16 0.00097 0.14 
Number Railway stations around   0.02115 5.77 
Number Railway stations in the commune / cell -0.01494 -7.10 0.00677 0.66 
Average travel time from j, commuting (TC) [hr] 0.01065 0.33   
TC*(Dummy female) [hr] -0.35600 -7.73   
Distance to highway [km]   -0.00067 -0.33 
Distance to arterial [km]   -0.01314 -4.96 
Distance to Châtelet (Paris centre) [km]   -0.00028 -0.47 
% households with 1 member * 1 member in h -0.16085 -1.15 2.30278 20.02 
% households with 2 members* 2 members in h -0.28286 -0.75 2.04371 9.65 
% households with 3+ members* 3+ member in h -0.08790 -0.59 2.11213 19.15 
% hh with no working member * no working member in h 5.09950 16.50 3.30625 15.56 
% hh with 1 working member * 1 working member in h -2.63547 -12.42 1.65813 11.18 
% hh with 2+ working member * 2+ working member in h 1.53570 9.18 -0.04502 -0.36 
% hh with a young head -0.40537 -2.16 1.11631 9.36 
% hh with a young head * young head in h 1.93974 9.14 2.64059 19.00 
% hh with a middle age head * middle aged head in h -0.86585 -4.05 0.00740 0.05 
% Rich hh * Rich h 0.60752 3.91 2.56647 23.79 
% Medium Income hh * medium income h -0.37902 -1.73 1.97329 12.54 
% Poor hh * poor h -0.80207 -4.71 1.35812 11.62 
% households with a foreign head * foreign head in h 1.21668 4.63 3.99283 23.27 
% households with a foreign head * French head in h -0.10054 -0.67 -1.30069 -12.58 
% of surface in Redevelopment Area * Rich h 0.85358 5.58 -0.35104 -6.05 
% of surface in Redevelopment Area * Med. Inc. h 0.21783 1.82 -0.22336 -5.43 
% of surface in Redevelopment Area * Poor h 0.24909 2.28 0.12894 3.56 
Log of the number of residential units 0.01889 2.46 0.00828 1.11 
% of Flats in total dwellings * Foreign head in h 1.31465 10.50 0.06254 0.73 
% of Flats in total dwellings * French head in h 0.33011 3.75 0.07201 1.23 
% of Flats in total dwellings * (N. of members - 1) -0.08926 -3.23 0.00257 0.14 
% of Flats in total dwellings * young head in h 0.01850 0.23 -0.08934 -1.59 
% of Flats in total dwellings * old head in h -1.30230 -8.72 0.45902 4.19 
% of surface in Noisy area -0.14111 -1.94 0.01074 0.17 
% of surface covered by Forest -0.05748 -1.46 -0.25683 -4.21 
% of surf. covered by Forest * N. of Children 0.33436 5.07 0.30723 3.15 
% of surface covered by Water 0.35641 2.70 0.24600 2.99 
% of surface covered by Parks and Gardens -0.52131 -4.90 -0.05872 -1.08 
% of surf. covered by Parks * N. of children -0.26030 -1.36 0.56111 5.73 
% of surface covered by Sporting facilities 0.25816 1.41 -0.36015 -3.89 
% of surf. covered by Sporting facilities * N of children 0.48338 1.46 0.75183 4.63 
Notes: “%” sign represents the proportion. “N. of children” counts family members aged 11 or less. 
Source: Authors’ estimations 
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Interestingly, larger or older families are more sensitive to the price of houses than 
flats,9 which is consistent with the fact that, when they become older and/or have 
children, families have a stronger tendency to live in a house rather than in a flat. On the 
other hand, the price coefficient is more sensitive to income for flats than for houses. 
For the richest households, the net price effect is positive even in very large households 
with an old head. This reflects the fact that richer families are more sensitive to 
unobserved amenities and less sensitive to prices (for example they may be willing to 
pay a premium to live in neighbourhoods with exclusively wealthy neighbours). 
Households prefer living in communes with many subway or tramway stations, but 
dislike the close proximity of such stations. Note that a station located in the commune 
but not in the cell or surrounding cells is clearly beneficial since it improves 
accessibility. On the other hand, a very close station may be detrimental because of the 
noise and crowding, and the clustering of business activity around stations, so the sign 
of the overall effect is not clear a priori. 
Table 4 shows that households are mainly sensitive to stations in the commune or in 
the surrounding cells rather than in the cell they live, with positive and significant 
effects for the commune and negative for nearby stations. Railway stations around a cell 
were positive and significant in their influence on location choices, while it was 
negative in commune and not significant at the 5 percent level for cell-level 
concentration. This suggests that individuals value proximity to railway stations, and are 
willing to walk or drive (or take the bus) relatively long distances (more than 500 
meters, to go to adjacent cells.  
All the distance variables have a negative sign meaning that, ceteris paribus, 
households prefer to locate close to arterials or highways, or close to the centre of Paris 
(Châtelet). The negative coefficient for Paris dummy reflects the fact that, ceteris 
paribus, individuals prefer the suburbs to Paris. However, it seems more plausible that 
this negative coefficient rather reflects the non-linear effect of other variables, which are 
particularly high in Paris, and interactions with the distance variables. For example, the 
number of subway stations is particularly high in some cells within Paris. If the 
marginal utility of a subway station is decreasing with the number of subway stations, 
then imposing a linear specification for the effect of the number of subway stations 
leads to overestimate this effect in the cells or communes with a very large number of 
stations, which happen to be all located inside Paris. The (negative) Paris coefficients 
then corrects for this overestimation. This interpretation is consistent with the fact that 
Paris coefficient is significantly larger (in absolute terms) in the commune estimates 
than at the grid cell level (very large numbers of stations are more common in 
communes than in grid cells). 
We tested (results not reported here) a non-monotonous specification for the distance 
to arterial or to highway. The idea was that the close proximity to a highway is a 
nuisance because of pollution and noise, whereas individuals also dislike a too large 
distance to highway, for accessibility considerations. However, we failed to estimate the 
intuitive inverse U-shaped effect for those distance variables, with a large number of 
specifications for the covariates. This suggests that accessibility and travel time 
considerations dominate pollution and noise nuisance considerations with respect to 
location choice, at least at the scale we are measuring these effects. 
                                                 
9 The coefficient of Log(Price of House)* (Number of hh members – 1) is larger than the coefficient of 
Log(Price of flat)* (Number of hh members – 1) in absolute terms. 
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Female-headed households dislike communes with larger average commuting times 
by transit. This is consistent with the tendency towards shorter commutes by women 
reported elsewhere. We failed to estimate significant effects for average travel time 
using Private car or accessibility variables, probably because of the large correlation 
between the variables measuring distances, average travel times and accessibility.  
Households tend to prefer locating close to households with a rather young head. As 
far as age, household size or income is concerned, households tend to locate close to 
similar households. According to Table 4, these segregation effects seem to be more 
discernible at a small neighbourhood level, since the measures of social structure of 
population computed for grid cells are more significant than those computed for 
communes. This is consistent with intuition, since as the scale is increased one would 
expect to aggregate across more heterogeneous neighbourhoods. Note that the counter-
intuitive negative coefficients of some commune level variables in Table 4 might, 
similarly to Paris dummy, reflect some non-linearities of the effect of the corresponding 
composition variables. 
Foreign households tend to locate in grid cells and, to a lesser extent, communes with 
more foreign households, whereas French households prefer to locate in places with less 
foreign households. Poor households tend to locate close to other poor households, and 
the same is true for rich households. According to grid cell estimates, rich or medium 
income households tend to locate far away from ‘Redevelopment Areas’, whereas poor 
people have a stronger tendency to locate in such neighbourhoods, because they can not 
afford better locations. The positive effect of for rich or medium income households is 
harder to explain.  
As expected, households attempt to avoid noisy areas. According to Table 4, this 
effect is more important at the commune level than at the grid cell level, suggesting that 
the negative effect of airports are not limited to the grid cells suffering from severe 
noise, but influence a broader area. Households with children like living close to forests, 
whereas households without children seem to avoid forests. However, this probably 
reflects a displacement effect (more forests means less room for dwellings) rather than a 
preference effect. This hypothesis is supported by the more negative or less positive 
signs at the grid cell level (where the displacement effect is a priori more important) 
than at the commune level. Households seem to appreciate the proximity of water, but 
this is not very significant, and there seems to be some displacement effect at the grid 
cell level. 
Households tend to locate very close to parks and gardens, especially when they have 
children. This effect is important at the grid cell level, but negative and hardly 
significant at the commune level. The difference between commune and grid cell 
estimates might result from the fact that parents are only interested in parks and gardens 
available within walking distance. In addition, parks and gardens are rather uniformly 
distributed over communes. Households seem to appreciate the availability of sports 
spaces within the commune, even when they do not have children. The negative 
coefficient at the grid cell level may result from the displacement effect, since sports 
spaces are often large and occupy a significant fraction of a grid cell.  
We have studied the effect of density, which is positive and larger at the commune 
level than at the grid cell level (results not reported here). The positive coefficient for 
the logarithm of the number of households in the cell reflects the fact that new 
households tend to locate in more populated areas. This suggests that dense areas are 
more dynamic, attract more people and rotation is more important (more households 
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move in and out). The difference in the coefficients for cell and commune density 
results from a displacement effect (denser parts have less room for new households to 
come in). This displacement is likely to be more important at a small geographical level, 
since a large density in a cell probably means a large density everywhere in the cell, 
whereas a large density is a commune may corresponds to a very large density in some 
parts and more room for new households in other parts of the commune. These results 
on interactions of household characteristics with social characteristics of 
neighbourhoods are consistent with a substantial body of literature on residential 
segregation tendencies. Note that the analysis used importance sampling, meaning that 
the alternative cells were included in the choice set with a probability proportional to the 
number of dwellings, so the variable “Number households” was never zero. The 
coefficients of the number of collective dwellings (by itself and crossed with household 
size) means that only singles are attracted by collective dwellings, whereas 2-member 
households are not sensitive to the number of collective dwellings and larger families 
prefer locations with less collective dwellings. The opposite effects prevail for the 
number of individual dwellings, except that only families with more than 6 members are 
attracted by places with more individual dwellings. These two coefficients reflect both a 
displacement effect (more individual dwellings imply less room for new inhabitants) 
and a preference effect (larger families prefer a neighbourhood of individual dwellings). 
The displacement effect dominates for most families (6 members or less).  
Compared to the results reported in Table 3, the main difference in Table 4, from the 
grid cell estimation using grid cell and commune variables is that we can see more 
complex interactions among the scales at which different kinds of amenities are more 
significant. No clear dominance of one scale appears to emerge from these results for 
different types of effects. In some cases, the commune and grid cell effects are both 
significant and in agreement, while in others they have opposite signs, and in others 
only one or the other is significant. We do not attempt to generalize from this any clear 
lessons about the most natural scales for measuring differing locational amenity effects. 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
In this paper we have examined empirically local amenities in the Paris metropolitan 
region. We find first that there is considerable inequality in the spatial distribution of 
these local amenities, including accessibility, environmental and socio-economic 
indicators such as the distribution of households’ income, or the fraction of foreign-born 
population. We use spatial representation and Lorenz curves to examine the degree of 
inequality in these amenities over the population, and this provides evidence that some 
amenities (or disamenities) are much more unequally distributed than others. The most 
extremely unequally distributed amenities are noise (due to its concentration near 
airports), Redevelopment Areas, presence of water and forests, and presence of train 
and subway stations. Some measures, such as the Poulit accessibility measure, were 
remarkably insensitive, by contrast, appearing to be more ubiquitous. 
We have recognized that local amenities are generally capitalized into the housing 
market, and explored the willingness to pay of households for these amenities within the 
Paris region using alternative specifications of a location choice model. One of the core 
questions we examined was the spatial scale of the amenity effects and how this is 
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captured in a location choice context. By estimating models at both a commune and at a 
grid cell level, we have generated new insights into how households in the Paris region 
trade off amenities against each other and against housing cost. 
We find that the residential location choice model fits the data moderately better at the 
smaller scale of the grid cell level compared to the commune level. Some have 
previously argued that models are likely to fit better at more aggregate levels, but this is 
not what we find. This could be due to some combination of better measurement (less 
aggregation error), and a more accurate representation of households preferences of 
households. We have not completely avoided the MAUP problem, however, since both 
units of analysis we have examined are aggregate in nature. Nevertheless, our results are 
largely consistent at the two levels of geography, with some notable exceptions. Some 
amenities appear to be more localized in their effect while others are broader in their 
effect. 
This study has provided considerable insight into the way local amenities are 
distributed in the Paris region, and how these influence household location choices. 
Further elaboration of this research may explore ways of generating simulation-based 
sensitivity analysis to explore the trade-offs among amenities and cost for different 
classes of households. We also wish to further examine the potential endogeneity of 
prices, since amenities should be capitalized into housing prices. 
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